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Abstract7
Algorithms for approximate Bayesian inference, such as those based on sampling8
(i.e., Monte Carlo methods), provide a natural source of models of how people may9
deal with uncertainty with limited cognitive resources. Here, we consider the idea10
that individual differences in working memory capacity (WMC) may be usefully11
modeled in terms of the number of samples, or “particles”, available to perform in-12
ference. To test this idea, we focus on two recent experiments that report positive13
associations between WMC and two distinct aspects of categorization performance:14
the ability to learn novel categories, and the ability to switch between different cat-15
egorization strategies (“knowledge restructuring”). In favor of the idea of modeling16
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WMC as a number of particles, we show that a single model can reproduce both17
experimental results by varying the number of particles — increasing the number18
of particles leads to both faster category learning and improved strategy-switching.19
Furthermore, when we fit the model to individual participants, we found a positive20
association between WMC and best-fit number of particles for strategy switching.21
However, no association between WMC and best-fit number of particles was found22
for category learning. These results are discussed in the context of the general chal-23
lenge of disentangling the contributions of different potential sources of behavioral24
variability.25
1 Introduction26
How to deal with uncertainty arising from noisy and incomplete information is a27
ubiquitous challenge for natural and artificial agents alike. Bayesian statistics pro-28
vides a rigorous system for representing and reasoning about such uncertainty, yield-29
ing a principled method for updating beliefs in the light of new evidence (Bernardo30
& Smith, 1994). Human behavior is often well described in terms of Bayesian in-31
ference, from “low level” sensorimotor (Ko¨rding & Wolpert, 2004) and perceptual32
(Yuille & Kersten, 2006) phenomena, to “high level” competencies, such as causal33
reasoning (Griffiths & Tenenbaum, 2005), category learning (Sanborn, Navarro, &34
Griffiths, 2010), and predictions about future everyday events (Griffiths & Tenen-35
baum, 2006; reviews include Chater & Oaksford, 2008; Sanborn & Chater, 2016;36
Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2011).37
How humans frequently — though by no means always (e.g., Tversky & Kahne-38
man, 1974) — achieve this consistency with Bayesian principles is less clear. Though39
simple in principle, exact Bayesian calculations are frequently intractable in real-40
world settings, leading to a need for approximations. In statistics and computer41
science, this challenge has been met through the development of powerful, general-42
purpose techniques for approximate Bayesian inference, such as Monte Carlo meth-43
ods (Gelfand & Smith, 1990; Robert & Casella, 2004), which allow for the practical44
application of Bayesian methods in complex domains.45
The practical success of these techniques has naturally led to an interest in46
whether they also tell us something about how people reason under uncertainty.47
That is, they provide one source of hypotheses about the nature of the psycho-48
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logical and neural mechanisms that underlie how people process probabilistic in-49
formation (Chater & Oaksford, 2008; Doya, Ishii, Pouget, & Rao, 2007). Since50
the aim of these algorithms is to approximate the normative solution to a com-51
putational problem — i.e., to approximate Bayesian inference — they have been52
called rational process models when considered as candidate psychological mecha-53
nisms (Griffiths, Vul, & Sanborn, 2012; Sanborn et al., 2010). This distinguishes54
them from traditional process models in cognitive psychology, which are typically55
rich in postulated psychological mechanisms but often poor in terms of normative56
foundations (cf. Anderson, 1990).57
Importantly, Monte Carlo methods can in principle approximate probabilistic58
inference arbitrarily well when sufficient time and memory is available, thereby pro-59
viding a benchmark for ideal performance. At the same time, these methods display60
systematic deviations from the normative solution when resources are limited. Such61
“qualitative fingerprints” associated with different species of approximation may62
then be particularly illuminating when considering human cognition, where it is63
generally assumed that information processing capacity is limited (Daw, Courville,64
& Dayan, 2008; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996; Kahneman, 2003; Simon, 1982).65
One such limitation has long been associated with working memory (Cowan,66
2001; Miller, 1956), defined in cognitive psychology as the memory system respon-67
sible for temporary storage and manipulation of task-relevant information (Bad-68
deley, 1992; Baddeley & Hitch, 1974). Individual differences in working memory69
capacity (WMC), such as measured in the complex span paradigm (Daneman &70
Carpenter, 1980), have been found to predict performance on a variety of cognitive71
tasks, including conventional intelligence tests (Conway, Jarrold, Kane, Miyake, &72
Towse, 2007). Indeed, WMC may account for up to one half of the variance in73
general intelligence (Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003).74
However, the exact nature of the WMC limitation that underpins such individ-75
ual differences remains the subject of debate, with proposals variously emphasizing76
decay of representations (e.g., Baddeley, Thompson, & Buchanan, 1975), resource77
constraints (e.g., Just & Carpenter, 1992), or interference (e.g., Oberauer & Kliegl,78
2006; see Oberauer, Farrell, Jarrold, & Lewandowsky, 2016 for a recent discus-79
sion). Indeed, opinions continue to differ as to whether working memory is best80
conceptualized as discrete, e.g., comprising a limited number of “slots”, or as a81
more continuous “resource” that can be flexibly distributed across representations82
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in memory (Ma, Husain, & Bays, 2014; Suchow, Fougnie, Brady, & Alvarez, 2014).83
Our approach in the current work is to consider WMC limitations within the84
broader context of probabilistic inference, asking whether WMC may be usefully85
modeled as a constraint on the amount of inferential resources available. The im-86
plication is that at least in tasks involving uncertainty, enhanced performance in87
individuals with higher WMC may be attributable to an ability to better approxi-88
mate “ideal” Bayesian solutions.89
To begin to explore this idea, we focus on recent experiments showing positive90
associations between WMC and performance on category learning tasks (Lewandowsky,91
2011; Lewandowsky, Yang, Newell, & Kalish, 2012; Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2011,92
2012). This focus is motivated by two considerations. Firstly, category learning93
tasks are well characterized as probabilistic inference problems, requiring partic-94
ipants to reason about possible underlying category structures. Even when the95
mapping between stimuli and category labels is deterministic, participants face96
epistemic uncertainty regarding the nature of this mapping. Normative solutions97
to such problems, as well as how these solutions may be practically approximated98
— notably via Monte Carlo methods — have received substantial attention (An-99
derson, 1990; Goodman, Tenenbaum, Feldman, & Griffiths, 2008; Sanborn et al.,100
2010). We build on this previous work here. Secondly, WMC appears to be posi-101
tively associated with two distinct aspects of categorization: the ability to acquire102
novel categories (i.e., category learning; Lewandowsky, 2011), and the ability to103
flexibly switch between different categorization strategies (sometimes referred to as104
“knowledge restructuring”; Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012). Previous work has ex-105
plored how such positive associations may arise in formal category learning models106
(Lewandowsky, 2011; Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2011, 2012) but has treated these107
aspects of categorization separately, and via different models and mechanisms; the108
possibility that WMC may influence both category learning and knowledge restruc-109
turing via a single mechanism has not been explored, and we seek such a common110
mechanism in the present article.111
The key assumptions of the current work are that individuals approximate112
Bayesian solutions to category learning problems by sampling from probability113
distributions (i.e., via Monte Carlo inference) and, more importantly, that an indi-114
vidual’s WMC directly translates into how many samples, or hypotheses, they are115
able to represent at one time. We show that this simple equating of WMC with116
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the number of active hypotheses allows us to reproduce the positive associations117
between WMC and both aspects of categorization performance — category learn-118
ing and knowledge restructuring — with a single mechanism. Before describing119
the modeling approach and results in detail, we briefly summarize the basic ideas120
behind Monte Carlo methods and the target experimental results.121
1.1 Monte Carlo as a psychological mechanism122
In the Bayesian paradigm, background knowledge gives rise to a constrained set of123
candidate hypotheses H for the true state of nature, and to associated degrees of124
belief P (h) in each candidate in the set h ∈ H. The sum of all beliefs about the125
true state of nature is fixed to 1. Such “prior” beliefs are updated in the light of126
observed data d to yield “posterior” beliefs P (h|d) via Bayes’ theorem,127
P (h|d) = P (d|h)P (h)∑
h′∈H P (d|h′)P (h′)
,
where the likelihood P (d|h) quantifies how expected the data are under each can-128
didate hypothesis.129
As we will describe in detail below, for our purposes the state of nature is the130
true category structure that participants are required to learn; the set of candidate131
hypotheses is the space of all possible category structures that a participant is132
assumed to be able to generate; and the observed data are the particular category133
instances presented to participants that they must categorize and for which they134
subsequently receive feedback about the correct category label.135
While Bayes’ theorem is simple to write down, it leads to complex practical136
issues such as the source of the prior distribution, the choice of likelihood function,137
and how to compute and summarize the posterior distribution if the hypothesis138
space H is very large — such as when H is the space of all possible categories.139
In Monte Carlo methods, the basic idea is to approximate the target distribution140
P (h|d) by drawing samples from it. In other words, one represents P (h|d) with a141
set of samples {h(i)} ∼ P (h|d) from that distribution, each randomly selected with142
a frequency proportional to its probability in the full distribution.143
In the case where beliefs are updated sequentially as new information arrives144
— as in the experiments we consider below, where participants receive feedback145
trial by trial — one attempts to approximate a sequence of target distributions,146
and so we are more specifically interested in the idea of sequential Monte Carlo, or147
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“particle filtering” (Doucet, de Freitas, & Gordon, 2001). As we will describe in148
more detail, one way of promoting a good approximation to posterior distributions149
in this instance is to propose local changes to a current hypothesis h, and to accept150
or reject the proposed variant h′ as a function of its posterior probability. This151
latter process can be thought of in terms of continuous exploration, or search, of152
the hypothesis space for regions of high probability.153
These two characteristics of Monte Carlo inference — representation by a limited154
number of hypotheses, and inference as involving an active process of exploration,155
or search, of the posterior — draw parallels with working memory, which is typically156
characterized not only as limited in capacity but also as active memory (Baddeley,157
1992). In other words, if WMC is the number of hypotheses that one can actively158
maintain and manipulate at a given time, and if these latter processes can be cast in159
terms of probabilistic inference, then a possible analogy between working memory160
processes and Monte Carlo inference presents itself.161
Of course, the idea that sampling plays a role in psychological mechanisms has162
a long tradition in psychology (Busemeyer, 1985; Estes, 1950; Restle, 1962; Stew-163
art, Chater, & Brown, 2006), though not typically in the context of approximating164
Bayesian inference. More recent work has explicitly considered sample-based infer-165
ence as a possible psychological mechanism (recent reviews include Griffiths et al.,166
2012; Suchow, Bourgin, & Griffiths, 2017). For example, Vul and Pashler (2008)167
argued that the “wisdom of crowds” effect, where the error of a judgment averaged168
over individuals is substantially smaller than the average error of individual judg-169
ments, is consistent with individuals using only a limited number of samples to form170
estimates (cf. Lewandowsky, Griffiths, & Kalish, 2009). Other work has focused on171
apparent suboptimalities displayed in people’s sensitivity to the ordering of infor-172
mation when they must update their beliefs over time. Such order effects have173
been successfully captured by models employing sequential inference with limited174
samples in a variety of domains, including change detection (Brown & Steyvers,175
2009), garden path effects in sentence processing (Levy, Reali, & Griffiths, 2008),176
and category learning (Sanborn et al., 2010).177
1.2 Working memory capacity and category learning178
Despite the central importance of both working memory and categorization in cogni-179
tion, until recently the relationship between these abilities received scant attention.180
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The nature of this relationship is of interest not only to provide further constraints181
on adequate theories of these faculties, but also in light of recent arguments for the182
existence of multiple categorization systems that rely to differing degrees on distinct183
memory systems. One salient hypothesis is that category learning tasks that can be184
solved with relatively simple, verbalizable rules (“rule-based” tasks) rely especially185
on working memory, while tasks with solutions that generally defy description in186
terms of simple rules (“information-integration” tasks) do not (Ashby & Maddox,187
2005, 2011; Ashby & O’Brien, 2005).188
In contrast to this proposal, recent studies have found a positive association be-189
tween WMC and category learning performance, regardless of whether the catego-190
rization task is rule-based (Lewandowsky, 2011) or based on information-integration191
(Lewandowsky et al., 2012). Interestingly, WMC has also been found to be posi-192
tively associated with a somewhat distinct aspect of categorization, namely the abil-193
ity to flexibly switch between different categorization strategies (Sewell & Lewandowsky,194
2012) — a capacity that the authors refer to as “knowledge restructuring”. These195
apparently disparate findings, which we describe next, form the target of the current196
work.197
1.2.1 A positive association between WMC and category learning198
Lewandowsky (2011) used a battery of four working memory tasks (memory updat-199
ing, operation span, sentence span, and spatial short-term memory tasks — refer200
to the original paper for further detail and references) to measure the WMC of201
participants before testing their category learning performance on the six classical202
problem types of Shepard, Hovland, and Jenkins (1961) (henceforth “SHJ”). Each203
problem type involves learning to assign each of a set of 8 stimuli to category A or204
B based on their values on 3 binary dimensions (Fig. 1A); half of the stimuli are205
assigned to category A, and the other half to category B. There are 72 possible206
assignments that satisfy these conditions, but these reduce to 6 “types” assuming207
interchangeability of dimensions and labels (Fig. 1B). The problem types vary with208
respect to the number of stimulus dimensions that are relevant for classification.209
For example, in a Type I problem, only a single dimension is relevant; in a Type210
VI problem, by contrast, all 3 dimensions are relevant.211
Consistent with the classical results, Lewandowsky found that the average trend212
of participants was to learn a Type I problem fastest, a Type VI problem the slow-213
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est, with Types II–V clustered in between (Fig. 1C). Crucially, structural equa-214
tion modeling of WMC and category learning measures also revealed that WMC215
was positively related to category learning performance in each problem type (see216
Lewandowsky, 2011 for details). In Figure 1D, we replot the data to show the over-217
all proportion of errors for each problem type given the median split of participants218
into high- and low-WMC groups based on their WMC scores. There is a clear219
trend for high-WMC participants to make fewer errors on each type of problem.220
Entering errors into a 2 (WMC: low, high) × 6 (Problem: I, II, III, IV, V, VI) × 12221
(Block: 1–12) repeated measures ANOVA confirmed that high-WMC participants222
were more accurate than low-WMC participants (F (1, 111) = 13.63, p < .01), with223
no significant interactions between WMC and the other factors. Low-WMC par-224
ticipants made significantly more errors on each problem type, with the exception225
of Type IV.226
1.2.2 A positive association between WMC and knowledge re-227
structuring228
Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012) found that higher WMC (where WMC was as-229
sessed using the same battery of measures as in Lewandowsky, 2011) was associated230
not only with better category learning performance, consistent with the findings of231
Lewandowsky (2011), but also with an improved ability to switch between cat-232
egorization strategies when instructed to do so — an ability assumed to reflect233
knowledge restructuring (Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2011).234
Like the SHJ problems, the basic task in the studies by Sewell and Lewandowsky235
(2012) was to learn to assign stimuli to category A or B. Here, stimuli were rectan-236
gles that varied with respect to 3 features (height, the position a vertical bar located237
along their base, and color). Stimuli were assigned to category A or B depending238
on their position in stimulus space (Fig. 2A). Height and bar offset were continu-239
ous dimensions, whereas color could take only one of 2 values (e.g., blue or red).240
Training stimuli (filled circles, Fig. 2A) were clustered into two separate regions of241
category space, with categories arranged so that partial category boundaries (solid242
lines, Fig. 2A) could not be integrated in a coherent manner — i.e, neither partial243
boundary could be extended in a way that allowed accurate classification of training244
stimuli in the other cluster, thereby encouraging co-ordination of multiple partial245
rules (for fuller discussion, see Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012).246
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Figure 1: The 6 category learning problem types of Shepard et al. (1961).
(A) Each one of 8 stimuli is defined by its unique combination of values on three di-
mensions (e.g., color, size, and shape) that correspond to the edges of the cube. (B) In
each problem type, 4 stimuli are assigned to category A (filled circles), and the remain-
ing 4 stimuli are assigned to category B (open circles). (C) Learning curves for each
problem type, averaged over all participants, measured by Lewandowsky (data replotted
from Lewandowsky, 2011). (D) Overall proportion of errors for high- and low-WMC
participants (median split by WMC score) for each problem type. Error bars represent
+1SE.
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Figure 2: Knowledge restructuring task of Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012).
(A) Experimental stimuli. These were rectangles (two examples shown at top) that varied with respect
to their height, position of a vertically-oriented bar along their base, and color (e.g., blue or red). Stimuli
were assigned to category A or B depending on their position in stimulus space. Filled circles denote
training stimuli, open squares denote test stimuli, and solid lines indicate the partial rule boundaries. (B)
Ideal response profiles associated with the context-insensitive (CI; top row) and knowledge-partitioning
(KP; bottom row) categorization strategies. Shading indicates the probability with which a test stimulus
should be classified as belonging to category A (darker color indicates a higher probability). Ideal
performance in the different contexts (i.e., test stimulus presented in blue or red) is shown in the left
and right columns of panels, respectively. (C) Context sensitivity across all transfer tests for knowledge-
partitioning (KP)-first and context-insensitive (CI)-first conditions. Error bars indicate ±1 SEM . (D)
Mean absolute change in context sensitivity (CS) for participants with WMC scores in the top and
bottom quartiles (“High” and “Low” WMC, respectively) for Session 1 (i.e., between transfer tests 1 and
2) and Session 2 (i.e., between transfer tests 3 and 4). Error bars indicate +1SE. Figures A–C after
Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012).
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Importantly, equally good categorization performance in this task could be ob-247
tained by learning any one of a number of different strategies. For example, a248
participant could use the color of the rectangle to decide whether height (for blue249
rectangles) or bar position (for red rectangles) predicted category A or B — this250
was named a knowledge-partitioning (KP) strategy. Alternatively, a participant251
could attend to whether bar position was to the left or right of center in order252
to then diagnose category membership based on either height or, again, bar po-253
sition — thereby ignoring the color dimension entirely. This latter was named a254
context-insensitive (CI) strategy.255
The crucial experimental manipulation was to encourage a participant, using256
verbal instruction, to first learn one of these 2 strategies — by hinting that the257
problem could be solved using bar position (for a participant assigned to the “CI-258
first” experimental group) or color (for a participant assigned to the “KP-first”259
experimental group) — before giving the participant an unexpected instruction to260
switch to using the alternative strategy. The degree to which participants’ predic-261
tions conformed to a CI or KP strategy could be assessed via their generalization262
performance on a set of test stimuli (open squares, Fig. 2A), since generalization263
performance should be either insensitive (CI strategy) or sensitive (KP strategy)264
to the color of the presented stimuli (Fig. 2B). On the basis of their generalization265
pattern, participants were assigned a “context sensitivity” score, summarizing the266
degree to which their performance best conformed to a CI (context sensitivity close267
to 0) or KP (context sensitivity close to 1) strategy.268
Regardless of whether participants were encouraged to use a CI or KP strategy in269
the first instance, they were able to shift between strategies without any training on270
the novel strategy (Fig. 2C), an ability assumed to reflect knowledge restructuring271
(Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2011). More importantly for our purposes, however, was272
the finding of a significant positive correlation between WMC and the extent of273
knowledge restructuring, the latter being measured in terms of the absolute change274
in context sensitivity in each test session (see Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012, for full275
details of the structural equation modeling approach and results). Figure 2D shows276
the average change in context sensitivity for participants with WMC scores in the277
top and bottom quartiles, for Session 1 (i.e., changes between transfer tests 1 and 2)278
and Session 2 (i.e., changes between transfer tests 3 and 4). Entering these change279
scores into a 2 (WMC: low, high) × 2 (Condition: CI-first, KP-first) × 2 (Session: 1,280
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2) repeated measures ANOVA confirmed a main effect of WMC on change in context281
sensitivity (F (1, 47) = 4.42, p < .05). High-WMC participants had significantly282
higher changes in context sensitivity in Session 1 (t(48) = 2.81, p < .01), though283
not in Session 2 (t(48) = 1.17, ns); we defer discussion of this, and further subtleties284
of the experimental results, until later (see Discussion).285
The results of Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012) thus suggest that WMC supports286
not just standard category learning but also the flexible application of different287
categorization strategies.288
2 Modeling approach289
The hypothesis of the current study was that by equating working memory capacity290
(WMC) with the number of samples available for inference in a Bayesian category291
learning model, positive associations between WMC, category learning, and knowl-292
edge restructuring would naturally arise, consistent with the experimental findings.293
Our model can be described as comprising three parts: 1) a model of how294
participants are assumed to represent categories, specified in terms of an explicit295
process whereby categories can be constructed (i.e., a “generative model”); 2) a296
procedure by which participants are assumed to infer categories in light of their297
prior assumptions and the experimental stimuli; and 3) a means for translating298
participants’ beliefs about categories into choice, i.e., a prediction of the category299
label associated with a stimulus before receiving feedback about the true label.300
2.1 Category representation301
Many representational formats for categories have been discussed in the literature,302
including rules (Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Goodman et al., 2008; Nosof-303
sky, Palmeri, & McKinley, 1994), prototypes (Posner & Keele, 1968; Rosch, 1973),304
exemplars (Kruschke, 1992; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986), or some mix-305
ture of these (Anderson, 1991; Ashby, Alfonso-Reese, Turken, & Waldron, 1998;306
Love, Medin, & Gureckis, 2004). In the current work, we chose to work within the307
framework of classification and regression tree (CART) models (Breiman, Fried-308
man, Olshen, & Stone, 1984), which can be considered a type of rule-based rep-309
resentation. This choice was largely pragmatic. Firstly, CART models offer an310
intuitive format for the categories used in the experimental tasks of interest, which311
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are readily described in terms of simple, verbalizable rules (i.e., “rule-based”, in312
the terms of Ashby & Maddox, 2005) and that also suggest an ordering on rules313
(particularly the task of Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012; see below). Secondly, as314
we will describe, these models are amenable to a Bayesian formulation (Chipman,315
George, & McCulloch, 1998), which is obviously crucial for our purposes.316
Most broadly, CART models (Breiman et al., 1984) provide a flexible method for317
specifying the conditional distribution of a response variable (e.g., a category label)318
given a collection of input predictors (e.g., stimulus features). In the experiments we319
consider, category labels are always binary, y ∈ {A,B}, and each stimulus to be cat-320
egorized is represented by a p-dimensional feature vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xp).
1 The321
models work by recursively partitioning the input space into axis-aligned cuboids322
— imagine making a series of axis-aligned “slices” through the input space — and323
applying a simple conditional model to each region; the sequence of partitions on324
the input space can be represented as a binary tree (Fig. 3A).325
Formally, a binary tree structure T consists of a hierarchy of nodes η ∈ T. Nodes326
with children, or leaves, are referred to as internal nodes, while nodes without327
children are referred to as leaf nodes (Fig. 3A, right). The set of internal nodes for328
T is denoted IT, and the set of leaves is denoted LT. Each internal node η ∈ IT329
has exactly two children, called the left child ηL and right child ηR. Each node is330
associated with a block B(η) ⊆ Rp of the input space as follows (cf. Fig. 3A, left):331
the root node is associated with the entire input space, while each further internal332
node splits its block into two parts by selecting a single dimension κ(η) = {1, . . . , p}333
and location τ(η) so that334
B(ηL) = B(η) ∩ {x : xκ(η) ≤ τ(η)} and
B(ηR) = B(η) ∩ {x : xκ(η) > τ(η)}.
The block of input space associated with a node η is determined by the ranges335
on each dimension j that it covers, and we denote the corresponding range Rηj =336
[Rη,−j , R
η,+
j ]. We call the tuple T = (T, κ, τ) the decision tree.337
In addition to a decision tree T with K leaf nodes, a CART model has a pa-338
rameter Θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θK), which associates parameter value θk with the kth leaf339
node. If a stimulus x lies in the region of the kth leaf node, then y|x has distribution340
1In both experiments, p = 3, but we use the more general notation for presentation purposes.
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Figure 3: Representing categories with a classification tree.
(A) Consider the stimulus space of Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012), which comprises 3 stimulus dimen-
sions (color, height, and bar position) and can be represented as a cube (left). A single partition of this
space into 2 subspaces can be achieved by selecting one of the stimulus dimensions (here, bar position)
and splitting the space on that dimension at a particular location. This partitioning can be represented
by a simple binary tree (right). The root node η (which is also an “internal” node) is associated with the
full stimulus space B(η). In this example, node η is split on the dimension corresponding to bar position
(κ(η) = bar position) at a location τ(η). This partitions the input space into two blocks, B(ηL) and
B(ηR), associated with the “leaf” nodes ηL and ηR. (B) Tree corresponding to a knowledge-partitioning
(KP) strategy; the initial split is on the color dimension. (D) Tree corresponding to a context-insensitive
(CI) strategy; the initial split is on the bar position dimension. (E) In the model, proposed modifications
to trees may be of 3 types, each involving the initial random selection of a node (shaded red): grow
selects a leaf node for expansion (i.e., splitting); prune selects an internal node and renders it a leaf
node by deleting all nodes below it; and change selects an internal node and assigns it a new rule (i.e.,
a splitting dimension and location).
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f(y|θk) for some parametric family f . It is typically assumed that, conditional on341
(Θ, T ), y values within a leaf node are i.i.d., and furthermore, that y values across342
leaf nodes are independent. Thus, letting nk denote the number of observations as-343
signed to the kth leaf node and letting yk,i denote the ith observation of y assigned344
to leaf k,345
p(y1:n|x1:n,Θ, T ) =
K∏
k=1
nk∏
i=1
f(yk,i|θk), (1)
where n =
∑K
k=1 nk is the total number of observations. As we will make more346
precise below, for us, the parameter θk is the probability that a stimulus within the347
kth leaf node has category label A.348
This provides a general framework for representing categories, but we require a349
more detailed specification for the experiments of interest. We now do this for the350
categorization task used by Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012), described above. The351
SHJ tasks employed in Lewandowsky (2011) are simpler and are straightforwardly352
modeled with only minor modifications.353
In the Sewell–Lewandowsky task, the stimulus on each trial t comprised a 3-354
dimensional input xt = (xt,1 = bar positiont ∈ R, xt,2 = heightt ∈ R+, xt,3 =355
colort ∈ {blue = 0, red = 1}).2 On training trials, participants made a category356
prediction before observing the binary category label yt ∈ {A,B}. The “ideal”357
knowledge-partitioning (KP) and context-insensitive (CI) strategies which partic-358
ipants were encouraged to learn and deploy can be naturally represented in tree359
form (Figs 3B,C).360
In the Bayesian framework, we need to specify some prior beliefs about the361
state of nature. In the current case, the relevant prior beliefs concern category362
structure which, by modeling assumption, can be formalized as a prior distribution363
on decision trees. Such a prior can be imposed implicitly by specifying a stochastic364
process for generating such trees. Following Chipman et al. (1998), we set the prior365
probability of a node η in tree structure T being split into children nodes to be366
pSPLIT(η,T) =
α
(1 + dη)β
, (2)
where dη denotes the depth of the node (the depth of the root node is zero), and α <367
1 and β ≥ 0 are parameters controlling expected tree size. Under this specification,368
2Of course, in reality, bar position and height were much more restricted than indicated — we mean
only to emphasize by the use of R that these are continuous variables.
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the probability pSPLIT is a decreasing function of node depth, and decreases more369
steeply for large β (cf. Figure 3 of Chipman et al., 1998). In all simulations, we370
fix α = 0.95 and β = 1, which gives a prior mean on the number of terminal371
nodes ≈ 3.7 (Chipman et al., 1998), but results are essentially identical for other372
reasonable parameterizations.373
In addition to a prior on tree structure T achieved through a prior on a node’s374
probability of splitting, we need to specify the prior probability of a node η splitting375
on each stimulus dimension κ(η) = {1, . . . , p} and location τ(η). We generally376
assume that the probability of splitting on each dimension is equal, i.e.,377
p(κ(η) = j) = 1/p, j = 1, . . . , p. (3)
Conditional on the choice of dimension, a split location is assumed to be drawn378
uniformly from the node’s range on the relevant dimension:379
τ(η)|κ(η) = j ∼ U(Rη,−j , Rη,+j ). (4)
However, consideration of the information given to participants at the outset of380
Sewell and Lewandowsky’s experiment leads us to a slightly different prior for the381
root node η0. In particular, in the experiment, participants were initially told382
that stimulus color (KP-first condition) or bar position (CI-first condition) reliably383
indicated whether height or bar position was diagnostic of stimulus category. We384
assume that this information is reflected in the prior probability of splitting the385
root node η0 on a particular dimension. Thus, we introduce a “bias” parameter b386
to indicate that splits of the root node η0 on one dimension should be regarded as387
much more likely than on the others. Letting j∗ indicate the dimension highlighted388
by instruction, we can write this prior probability as389
p(κ(η0)) =

b if κ(η0) = j
∗,
1−b
2 otherwise.
. (5)
Setting b < 1, which would give nonzero probability to alternative splits at the root,390
might reflect incomplete confidence in the experimenter’s instructions, for example.391
In addition, participants were not only guided to a particular initial dimension392
— bar position or color — but effectively also to an initial split location. Thus,393
in the KP-first condition, attention was drawn to the color of the stimulus, while394
in the CI-first condition, participants were explicitly told that the relevant feature395
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was whether the bar was to the left or right of centre. We therefore assume that396
split locations for the highlighted dimension at the root node are known. Note397
that the question of split location is actually irrelevant in the case of the (binary)398
color dimension since all split locations on (0, 1) are equivalent in terms of the399
resulting partition. However, this dimension can be treated as continuous for ease400
of presentation and without consequence for modeling outcomes.401
The preceding specifies a simple prior distribution on decision trees p(T ) that402
can be summarized as a process of deciding whether to split each node and, if so,403
selecting a splitting dimension and location. To complete the model specification,404
we also require a likelihood model p(y1:t|x1:t, T ) that gives the conditional proba-405
bilities of stimulus labels given the tree structure. In this case, we simply assume406
that the kth leaf node has an associated probability θk of generating label A,407
p(yt|θk,xt) = θytk (1− θk)1−yt , (6)
and that this probability is an i.i.d. draw from a Beta distribution,408
θk
iid∼ Beta(a0, b0). (7)
Standard analytical simplification for this beta-binomial model yields the marginal409
likelihood410
p(y1:t|T ,x1:t) =
(
Γ(a0 + b0)
Γ(a0)Γ(b0)
)K K∏
k=1
Γ(ntkA + a0)Γ(n
t
k· − ntkA + b0)
Γ(ntk· + a0 + b0)
, (8)
where ntkA and n
t
k· are respectively the number of instances of category A and411
the total number of data points in the partition of leaf k up to trial t. Note412
that for a given tree, this likelihood is higher for leaves assigned observations with413
homogeneous labels (i.e., with labels that are either mostly A or mostly B). These414
are exactly the partitions that constitute “good” solutions to the categorization415
problem.416
2.2 Inference417
Given the model specified above, we assume that participants seek to represent418
the sequence of posterior distributions over possible trees {p(T |x1:t, y1:t)}Tt=1 as419
they successively predict and receive information about stimulus labels over trials.420
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Generally, a brute force procedure of enumerating all possible trees, a space which421
dramatically increases in size with t, is not a plausible model of how participants422
perform inference. Instead, we assume that people’s beliefs are represented by a423
relatively small number of samples from these posterior distributions which can be424
updated over time. In other words, we model participants as performing particle425
filtering (Daw & Courville, 2008; Doucet et al., 2001; Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro,426
2006).427
As mentioned above, two aspects of the inference process which we now describe428
draw parallels with working memory. Firstly, similar to the idea that there is a limit429
on the number of items that can be held in working memory (Cowan, 2001), we430
assume there is a bounded number of hypotheses about category structure — in this431
case, the samples/particles which correspond to particular tree structures — that432
can be entertained at a given time. Secondly, similar to the notion that working433
memory is active (Baddeley, 1992), involving the manipulation rather than merely434
passive storage of items, we assume that inference involves a continuing process435
whereby local transformations to current hypotheses are proposed, and which may436
be accepted or rejected. The latter process promotes diversity in the hypothesis set437
and continuous exploration of the hypothesis space.438
In detail, we assume that on a given trial t, a participant’s beliefs are repre-439
sented by a small set of L possible trees {T (l)}Ll=1 with associated weights {w(l)t }Ll=1440
proportional to their posterior probability. This set of trees constitutes the limited441
set of hypotheses putatively maintained in a working memory of capacity L. With442
the observation of the stimulus and category label on the next trial t+ 1, a proper443
reweighting of the lth tree is given by the following update (Chopin, 2002):444
w
(l)
t+1 ∝ w(l)t
p(T (l)|x1:t+1, y1:t+1)
p(T (l)|x1:t, y1:t)
∝ w(l)t
p(y1:t+1|T (l),x1:t+1)
p(y1:t|T (l),x1:t)
= w
(l)
t p(yt+1|T (l),xt+1, y1:t). (9)
As standard within particle filtering methods (Doucet et al., 2001), this reweighting445
process can be alternated with a resampling stage in which very unlikely trees, i.e.,446
those with very low weights, are discarded to be replaced by replicates of more447
probable trees. A simple way of doing this is to sample L times with replacement448
from the set {T (l)} with probabilities proportional to the updated weights {w(l)t+1}Ll=1449
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(Gordon, Salmond, & Smith, 1993).450
Additionally, this resampled particle set can then be “rejuvenated” (Chopin,451
2002; Gilks & Berzuini, 2001), reintroducing diversity and allowing continuous ex-452
ploration of alternative solutions. This is the “active” step which, we suggest, recalls453
conceptions of working memory as involving active manipulation of currently-stored454
items. Specifically, we may, without altering the targeted posterior distribution of455
interest, propose transformations of trees from a Markov chain transition kernel456
qt+1(·|T (l)) and accept or reject these proposals such that we retain the appro-457
priate stationary distribution p(T |x1:t+1, y1:t+1). Closely following the transition458
kernel suggested by Chipman et al. (1998), we consider the scheme where for each459
tree {T (l)}, a new tree T (l)∗ is proposed by randomly choosing among 3 possible460
transformations (Fig. 3D):461
1. GROW: Randomly select a leaf node, then draw a splitting dimension and462
location from the prior (Equations (3) and (4)). Not permitted if the split463
leads to an empty node (i.e., a partition with no assigned data points).464
2. PRUNE: Randomly select an internal node, then turn it into a leaf node by465
deleting all nodes below it. Not permitted if the tree comprises only the root466
node.467
3. CHANGE: Randomly select an internal node, then randomly reassign it a468
splitting dimension and location by a draw from the prior. Not permitted469
if the reassigned split is inconsistent with splits of nodes below the selected470
node.471
This proposed tree T (l)∗ is then accepted with probability472
α(T (l), T (l)∗) = min
{
1,
p(T (l)∗|x1:t+1, y1:t+1)/qt+1(T (l)∗|T (l))
p(T (l)|x1:t+1, y1:t+1)/qt+1(T (l)|T (l)∗)
}
, (10)
as per the standard Metropolis-Hastings algorithm (Gelman, Carlin, Stern, & Ru-473
bin, 2004). This simple “resample-move” algorithm (Chopin, 2002; Gilks & Berzuini,474
2001) is summarized in Algorithm 1.475
Why might the number of samples/particles be expected to influence category476
learning? The basic intuition comes from viewing the category learning process477
as one of search (Fig. 4). In particular, “good” category structures are those that478
partition stimuli into regions with homogeneous labels (A or B), and these are479
the category structures that have high posterior probability. In the sample-based480
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Algorithm 1 Resample-Move.
Draw L sample trees from the prior p(T ) and initialize all weights to w(l)0 = 1/L.
for each trial t = 1, 2, . . . do
Update each particle’s weight w
(l)
t ∝ w(l)t−1 × p(yt|T (l),xt, y1:t−1).
Resample particles proportional to their updated weights {w(l)t }Ll=1.
Reset each of the (resampled) particle’s weights to w
(l)
t = 1/L.
for each particle l = 1, 2, . . . , L do
Propose a new tree T (l)∗ ∼ qt(·|T (l)).
Accept the proposal with probability α(T (l), T (l)∗) (as in Eq.(10)).
end for
end for
inference procedure we consider, the population of particles will seek out regions481
of high posterior probability, and the rate at which these regions are found may482
plausibly depend on the number of particles.483
So far, we have suggested a particle filtering scheme for representing a sequence484
of posterior distributions over category structures, where that structure is assumed485
to be specified by a classification tree. However, we have not yet addressed the issue486
of strategy switching. Thus, in the Sewell–Lewandowsky experiment, participants487
were able to immediately switch between different categorization strategies when488
instructed to do so, and in the absence of further training.489
We model such switches as a simple reweighting operation on the set of trees.490
Take the specific example where a participant has initially been encouraged to491
use the CI strategy and after t training sessions has in mind the set of weighted492
trees {T (l), w(l)t }Ll=1 approximating the target distribution under the prior appro-493
priate to the CI strategy. We denote this target distribution pCI(T |x1:t, y1:t). The494
experimenter then instructs the participant to change to using the KP strategy.495
Assuming that the set of trees remains fixed, the associated tree weights now need496
to be changed to reflect the new target distribution pKP (T |x1:t, y1:t). This can be497
achieved by an importance weighting step, treating pCI(T |x1:t, y1:t) as the impor-498
tance distribution. In particular, denoting a particle’s weight before and after the499
instruction to switch as w
(l)−
t and w
(l)+
t , respectively, the relevant reweighting is500
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Figure 4: Category learning as search.
In the formulation here, category learning is conceptualized as a process of search for
category structures h ∈ H that have a high posterior probability, p(h|D), given both the
prior distribution on category structures and the observed data, D. In the sample-based
inference procedure considered, this search is enacted by a particle set (black circles)
whose positions may be changed through the acceptance of proposed local changes to
the corresponding category structure. Proposals that result in a category structure with
higher posterior probability (arrows) will be accepted more often. With a larger number
of particles (right), this search may be more efficient, in that high probability structures
will be discovered more quickly.
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w
(l)+
t ∝ w(l)−t
pKP (T (l)|x1:t, y1:t)
pCI(T (l)|x1:t, y1:t)
, (11)
which, under the specified model, becomes particularly simple:501
w
(l)+
t ∝

w
(l)−
t × (1−b2 )/b if κ(η0) = bar position,
w
(l)−
t if κ(η0) = height,
w
(l)−
t × b/(1−b2 ) if κ(η0) = color.
(12)
To switch in the reverse direction — from the KP to CI strategy — the appropri-502
ate reweighting involves the ratio pCI(T (l)|x1:t, y1:t)/pKP (T (l)|x1:t, y1:t), with the503
appropriate alterations made to Equation 12.504
Again, why might a greater number of particles improve ability to switch be-505
tween strategies? Consider the cartoon example in Figure 5A, depicting the pos-506
terior probability P (h|D) of different possible category structures h ∈ H given a507
stimulus set D. In this example, two particular category structures, h1 and h2, are508
most probable, and equally so, and we can think of these as being two equally valid509
categorization strategies, as in the Sewell–Lewandowsky task. Again, this proba-510
bility distribution will be represented by a set of particles with locations (i.e., par-511
ticular category structures) drawn from this distribution, along with corresponding512
weights that are proportional to the posterior probabilities of those locations.513
Now assume that the effect of an instruction to use a particular strategy is514
to increase the posterior probability of category structures that accord with that515
strategy, in this case those in the region of h1 (Fig. 5B). Such a change in posterior516
distribution, driven by the different priors underlying the distinct strategies, is517
exactly what we assumed when suggesting that strategy-switching is mediated by a518
reweighting of particles (see above). Depending on the number of particles available,519
how well this collection of particles represents the true posterior distribution —520
especially in regions of lower probability — may differ. With a sufficiently large521
number of particles, at least some particles should be allocated to regions of lower522
probability, such as around h2 (Fig. 5B, upper). However, with a decreasing number523
of particles, representation of the posterior distribution may become impoverished524
to the extent that such regions of low probability may not contain any particles525
at all (Fig. 5B, lower). In other words, the shift in “mental set” associated with526
a switch in categorization strategy is here implemented by a change in posterior527
distribution; the participant’s immediate ability to represent this change is assumed528
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to depend in some sense on the diversity of the current hypothesis set.529
The possible relevance to knowledge restructuring is what these different degrees530
of approximation to the true posterior may entail when instructed to switch catego-531
rization strategy. Intuitively, if fewer resources have been devoted to representing532
alternative strategies in the first place, however unlikely, then it may be more dif-533
ficult to entertain these alternatives when instructed to do so. In our particular534
formulation of the switching process, we considered a simple formulation in which535
the immediate effect of an instruction to switch strategy is that the locations of536
the particles remain the same, but the relative weightings of particles are updated537
according to the new posterior distribution (Fig. 5C). In particular, if there are538
particles located in the region of h2, these will immediately be updated (Fig. 5C,539
upper), and the new categorization strategy can be immediately deployed. By con-540
trast, if there are no particles located in the region of h2, no up-weighting can occur541
and the alternative strategy is initially unavailable (Fig. 5C, lower).542
2.3 Choice543
We have so far described a process for performing inference (i.e., particle filtering)544
under an assumed generative model for the structure of categories (i.e., CART).545
What is still missing is a model of how participants finally generate a guess about546
a stimulus’ category label before they receive feedback in the form of the true547
label. We consider two possible choice rules: one in which a participant chooses548
the category label with the highest probability (“maximum-probability rule”), and549
another in which a participant chooses a category label stochastically in accord550
with their probabilities (“probability-matching rule”). Since there is no explore-551
exploit dilemma in the categorization tasks we consider — full information about552
the correct label is always received, regardless of choice — participants should553
always select the label the think is most likely (i.e., maximum-probability rule).554
On the other hand, given that probability-matching behavior has sometimes been555
observed in this domain (e.g., Estes, Campbell, Hatsopoulos, & Hurwitz, 1989;556
Gluck & Bower, 1988), we considered it possible that participants also used this557
strategy, despite it being suboptimal in the tasks considered.558
From the above, a sample-based approximation to the predictive probability559
that a stimulus xt+1 has label yt+1 = A is given by560
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A B C
Figure 5: Particle diversity and flexibility of behavior.
Cartoon of how different numbers of particles affect the model’s ability to switch between
different categorization strategies. (A) Given the observed data D, comprising a set of
stimuli and their category labels, there is a posterior distribution P (h|D) over the set of
possible category structures h ∈ H. Here, two particular category structures h1 and h2
are equally probable, and can be considered as two equally valid categorization strategies.
The distribution can be approximated by a set of particles, where each particle has a par-
ticular location (circles), corresponding to a category structure h, and a weight, which is
proportional to the posterior probability (vertical, dashed lines). (B) The instruction to
use a particular strategy is conceptualized as biasing the posterior distribution so that
particular category structures are more probable, in this case category structures in the
region of h1. Whether regions of lower probability are represented in the approximation
depends on the number of particles: if there are many particles, some are likely to be
located in regions of lower probability, such as around h2 (upper); if there are fewer par-
ticles, there may be no particles in this region (lower). (C) The instruction to switch
strategy is conceptualized as leading to a change in the posterior distribution, and a cor-
responding change in the particle weights (upper); however, in the case of fewer particles,
there may be no particles immediately available to represent the change in distribution
(lower).
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p(yt+1 = A|x1:t+1, y1:t) =
∑
T
p(yt+1 = A|x1:t+1, y1:t, T )p(T |x1:t, y1:t)
≈ 1
L
L∑
l=1
p(yt+1 = A|x1:t+1, y1:t, T (l))
=
1
L
L∑
l=1
Eθk|x1:t+1,y1:t,T (l) [θk], (13)
noting that561
p(yt+1 = A|x1:t+1, y1:t, T (l)) =
∫
p(yt+1 = A|x1:t+1, y1:t, θk, T (l))p(θk|x1:t+1, y1:t, T (l))dθk
=
∫
θk p(θk|x1:t+1, y1:t, T (l))dθk
= Eθk|x1:t+1,y1:t,T (l) [θk].
Equation (13) simply says that an approximation to the predictive probability in562
this case is given by an unweighted average of posterior means for θk, where k for563
the lth particle is the index of the leaf node relevant to the input xt+1 in T (l). For564
the leaf model used in the current case, the posterior mean is given by565
Eθk|x1:t+1,y1:t,T (l) [θk] =
ntkA + a0
ntk· + a0 + b0
, (14)
where, again, ntkA and n
t
k· are respectively the number of instances of category A566
and the total number of data points in the partition of leaf k up to trial t.567
The deterministic maximum-probability rule would choose the category label568
with the highest predictive probability, but more generally we consider the -greedy569
form570
Pt+1(A) = (1− )1p˜(yt+1=A)>p˜(yt+1=B) + 0.5, (15)
where Pt+1(A) is the probability of guessing category A on trial (t+ 1), p˜(yt+1) is571
shorthand for the sample-based approximation given in Eq. (13),  is the probability572
of guessing a category label according to the flip of a fair coin, and 1· is the indicator573
function. In other words: choose the most probable label with probability (1− ),574
or with probability  simply flip a coin. When  = 0, we recover the deterministic575
case.576
The probability-matching rule takes the slightly different form577
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Pt+1(A) = (1− )p˜(yt+1 = A) + 0.5, (16)
so that the probability of guessing a category label is a linear combination of its578
predictive probability p˜(yt+1) (again, using shorthand for the probability given in579
Eq. (13)) and the guessing rate ; strict probability-matching is obtained when580
 = 0.581
Given that sample-based inference will itself tend to introduce stochasticity, we582
should comment on the addition of a guessing rate , which, for  > 0, will provide583
an additional source of variability. Briefly, our motivation was simply the (common)584
observation that model fit was improved by including this parameter; the behavior585
of participants tended to exhibit levels of variability beyond what our model would586
generate with  = 0, even with a single particle. As such,  captures our ignorance587
about such variability, which may arise from sources distinct from sample-based588
inference (e.g., lapses in attention, lack of motivation, etc.). Of course, the price589
to be paid for this improvement in fit, as we will see below, is that apportioning590
responsibility for behavioral variability to different components of the model —591
inference versus choice — becomes all the more difficult.592
2.4 Model-fitting and analysis593
Models of varying degrees of complexity were fit to the data by finding the com-594
bination of the parameters of our category-learning model (described above) that595
maximized the likelihood of the observed sequence of category predictions. Models596
varied in the number of parameters to be fit, lying on a spectrum from the simplest597
case, which required that all participants be fit by a single set of parameters, to598
the most complex case, in which each participant was fit with a separate set of599
parameters. Formally, denoting an observed sequence of predictions over T trials600
by c1:T and the full set of parameters by Φ = {L, b, α, β, a0, b0, } (see Table 1), the601
general aim was to find the (free) parameters Φ that maximized the probability602
p(c1:T |Φ,x1:T , y1:T−1) =
T∏
t=1
p(ct|Φ,x1:t, y1:t−1),
with the trial-by-trial probabilities extracted from Eq. (15) or Eq. (16), as appro-603
priate.604
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Best-fit parameters for a given model were defined as those maximizing the aver-605
age likelihood in a grid search. The grid was defined as follows: number of particles606
L logarithmically spaced on the interval [1, 100], yielding thirty-four values; guessing607
rate uniformly-spaced  ∈ (0, 0.02, 0.04, . . . , 0.2); and shape a0 ∈ (0.01, 0.1, 0.5, 1).608
In the knowledge-restructuring case, we also included three possible values of bias,609
b ∈ {0.5, 0.75, 0.9}. The grid values were chosen to reflect our a priori assumptions610
about plausible parameter values. That is, we expected participants to be more611
plausibly modeled as instantiating relatively few particles (hence the logarithmic612
scale), and as expressing noise levels in the lower range (hence the upper limit of613
0.2 on the guessing rate ). The choice of comparatively finely-spaced  values was614
motivated by the expectation that L and  would at least partly trade off with each615
other, so effort was made to make the resolution of these parameters comparable in616
order to minimize the possibility of bias. In addition, we included the case where617
the number of particles was set to a much larger number (L = 10, 000); this was618
to provide a comparison model that approximated the full posterior distribution619
much more closely than when the number of particles was more restricted.620
Since the estimate of the likelihood was generally less reliable with fewer parti-621
cles (due to greater variability in the algorithm’s behavior), the number of simula-622
tion runs was chosen so that an “effective” number of particles would be constant,623
thereby facilitating a fair comparison between the fits of different numbers of par-624
ticles. We set the effective number of particles to 1000, so that the number of625
simulation runs was determined by rounding to the nearest integer the result of626
1000/L (i.e., the 1-particle case was run 1000 times, the 100-particle case was run627
10 times, etc.).628
As mentioned in Section 2.3, we additionally compared two different choice mod-629
els. Modulo the effect of the guessing rate , either a stimulus was deterministically630
assigned to the most likely category (maximum-probability choice rule), or it was631
probabilistically assigned to a category in proportion to that category’s predictive632
probability (probability-matching choice rule).633
In evaluating the fit of different models, we used the Bayesian information cri-634
terion (BIC) to select the best-fitting model (Schwarz, 1978); that is, we chose the635
model M for which the quantity BIC ≡ − log(P (D|M, ΦˆM )) + 12k log(n) was mini-636
mized, where P (D|M, ΦˆM ) is the value of the likelihood function (see above) given637
the maximum likelihood estimate ΦˆM of the model parameters, k is the number of638
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estimated parameters in the model, and n is the number of data points (i.e., the639
number of trials).640
To assess relationships between best-fitting model parameters and participants’641
WMC scores, we used two methods. The simplest was simply to measure the642
correlation between these and determine whether the correlation was significantly643
different from zero. While this method is straightforward, the strength of the644
correlation can be reduced by both imprecision in estimating the best-fitting model645
parameters, as well as tradeoffs between parameters in fitting the data. While these646
issues cannot be entirely avoided, we developed a second measure to mitigate them647
which involved estimating a function that mapped WMC scores to a particular648
parameter of interest as part of the fitting procedure. To do so, we used BIC scores649
to compare slope-intercept models (in which the parameter of interest was a linear650
function of the individual WMC scores) against intercept-only models (in which651
the parameter was fixed across participants and thus did not depend on WMC652
scores). In cases in which there is a relationship between a parameter and WMC653
scores the slope-intercept model should perform better as the slope helps to capture654
that relationship. Our second measure helps address imprecision in estimating655
parameters because the parameters fit in the slope-intercept model are the best-656
fitting values that are consistent with a relationship with WMC, so if the individual657
parameters are somewhat imprecise but still consistent with a relationship to WMC,658
then the slope-intercept model would still perform best. Additionally, because659
of the concern of parameter tradeoffs in fitting the data, we allowed the other660
parameters in both the slope-intercept and intercept-only models to freely vary, so661
that these other parameters could trade off against the linear relationship between662
the parameter of interest and WMC in the way that allowed the best fit to the663
data. (ADAM HERE?) When comparing details of model fit with a participant’s664
WMC score, we always used for the latter the average of that participant’s scores665
over the battery of working memory tasks used in Lewandowsky (2011) and Sewell666
and Lewandowsky (2012).667
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Table 1: Model parameters. See text for details.
Parameters
Fixed Free
α = 0.95 L: number of particles
β = 1 b: bias
b0 = a0 a0: Beta shape parameter
: random guessing rate
3 Results668
3.1 Category learning669
3.1.1 Simulations670
Both Lewandowsky (2011) and Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012) found that working671
memory capacity (WMC) was positively correlated with category learning perfor-672
mance, such that participants with higher WMC tended to make fewer catego-673
rization errors. We hypothesized that a greater number of particles would have a674
similar effect because, on average, one might expect the search for a “good” (i.e.,675
more probable) category structure to progress faster, and with less chance of get-676
ting stuck at local maxima, with a higher number of particles (Fig. 4). Here, we677
focus on simulating the classical SHJ tasks used by Lewandowsky (2011). Since678
we always found that the probability-matching choice rule yielded better fits to the679
data than the maximum-probability rule (see Table 2 below), the simulation results680
always reflect use of the former.681
Figure 6A shows the overall average error rate for simulations as the number of682
particles is increased from 1 to 20 while keeping other parameter values fixed (a0 =683
1,  = 0); each data point represents 113 simulation runs, where each simulation684
run uses a stimulus sequence of 192 trials observed by one of the 113 participants685
in Lewandowsky (2011). For each problem type, increasing the number of particles686
does indeed lead to a decrease in the average proportion of errors, though the size687
of this effect is rather modest and quickly asymptotes (Note that the x-axis here688
indicates the number of particles — not block number, as in Fig. 1C).689
Note that even without attempting to fit the parameters of the model, the order-690
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ing of error rates produced by the model for the different problem types conforms691
to the basic SHJ pattern of results — Type I easiest and Type VI hardest, with692
Types II–V clustered in between. Briefly, this is because of the so-called “automatic693
Occam’s razor”, which refers to a preference for simpler, or more parsimonious, hy-694
potheses, and which arises naturally within the Bayesian framework (Goodman et695
al., 2008; MacKay, 2003).696
It is also interesting to note that the difference in the simulated error rates697
between the Type II problem and, for example, Type IV increases — up to a point698
— as the number of particles grows. An advantage in learning Type II relative to699
Type IV problems has been reported in the experimental literature (e.g., Nosofsky,700
Gluck, Palmeri, McKinley, & Glauthier, 1994; Shepard et al., 1961), though this has701
not always been found, as in Lewandowsky (2011) (cf. Kurtz, Levering, Stanton,702
Romero, & Morris, 2013). Given our basic hypothesis that WMC reflects number of703
particles, this simulation result prompts the question of whether Type II advantage704
depends on WMC.705
To investigate this further, we revisited the data of Lewandowsky (2011), split-706
ting participants into low- and high-WMC groups according to a median split of707
WMC scores and entering blockwise error rates into a 2 (WMC: low, high) × 2708
(Problem: II, IV) × 12 (Block: 1–12) repeated measures ANOVA. In addition to709
a main effect of WMC (F (1, 111) = 7.65, p < .01), we found a significant 3-way710
interaction between WMC*Problem*Block (F (11, 1221) = 2.19, p = .01). High-711
WMC participants performed significantly better in terms of proportion correct712
on Type II (M = 0.92, SD = 0.10) than on Type IV (M = 0.88, SD = 0.11;713
t(56) = 2.19, p = .02), while low-WMC participants did not perform significantly714
differently on these two problem types (Type II: M = 0.85, SD = 0.14; Type IV:715
M = 0.85, SD = 0.14, t(55)=0.06, n.s.). Learning curves are shown in the Ap-716
pendix (Fig. S1). This result is consistent with our basic hypothesis, as we expect717
a Type II advantage to appear, or become stronger, with more particles (i.e., higher718
WMC).719
The effect of a larger number of particles across problem types is further illus-720
trated in Figure 6B, where we compare the overall error proportions for the extreme721
case of 1 particle vs. 100 particles. A larger number of particles reduces the error722
rate for each problem type, and in a manner that qualitatively resembles that ob-723
served in the experimental data when participants are grouped according to WMC724
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Figure 6: Effect of model parameters on category learning in the SHJ problems.
Overall proportion of errors (i.e., averaged across blocks) for each problem type as each
parameter is varied. (A;B) Number of particles L; other parameters fixed a0 = 1,  = 0.
(C;D) Noise ; other parameters fixed a0 = 1, L = 1. (E;F) Shape a0; other parameters
fixed L = 1,  = 0. Numbers in (E) for Problem VI indicate the average number of nodes
in the final classification tree. Each data point represents an average of 113 simulation
runs; error bars in lower panels indicate +1SD. Note the reversed x-axes for Figures C
and E.
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score (cf. Fig. 1D). Indeed, a rank-ordering of problem types by the extent to which725
performance is better for higher WMC/particles revealed a significant positive cor-726
relation (Spearman’s rank-order correlation rs(4) = .94, p < .05). In other words,727
the problem types that show greatest difference between high- and low-WMC par-728
ticipants tend also to be those where an increased number of particles also makes729
the most difference (from greatest to smallest advantage, the experimental pattern730
follows the order VI,II,III,I,V,IV; our simulations follow the order VI,II,III,V,I,IV).731
We also examined the effect on performance of varying the other free param-732
eters (i.e., guessing rate  and shape a0). Figure 6C shows, unsurprisingly, that733
the proportion of errors decreases linearly as  decreases. Since this rate of de-734
crease is essentially uniform across problem types, the amount of improvement in735
each problem type is roughly the same (Fig. 6D). A simple inverse association736
between WMC and guessing rate therefore fails to capture differential effects of737
WMC on performance of the problem types (Spearman’s rank-order correlation738
rs(4) = −.37, p = .50, n.s.).739
Decreasing a0 generally leads to a lower error rate — recall that a higher a0740
entails a higher tolerance for “mixed” categories (i.e., instances of both A and B;741
cf. Section 2.1) — with Problem Type VI proving a notable exception (Figs 6E,F).742
Briefly, what happens in the latter case is that the model becomes increasingly intol-743
erant of the intermediate tree manipulations necessary to reach a more satisfactory744
solution; this can be observed, for example, in the decreasing average number of745
nodes in the final tree as a0 is decreased (Fig. 6E). A simple inverse association746
between WMC and shape therefore does a worse job compared to particles at cap-747
turing differential effects of WMC on performance of the different problem types748
(Spearman’s rank-order correlation, rs(4) = −.83, p = .06, n.s.).749
3.1.2 Model-fitting750
In fitting model parameters, we compared a number of possibilities ranging from751
the case where all participants were constrained to share a single set of parame-752
ters (Model 1; least flexible) to the case where each participant was free to have a753
different set of parameters for each problem type (Model 7; most flexible). Mod-754
els of intermediate complexity included the cases where two of the three free pa-755
rameters {L, a0, } were fixed across subjects, while the other free parameter was756
allowed to vary between subjects (Model 3: vary L; Model 4: vary ; Model 5:757
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vary a0). Since the probability-matching choice rule always fit better than the758
maximum-probability choice rule (compare numbers without and with parentheses,759
respectively, in Table 2), we restrict our attention to the results of the former case.760
In terms of Bayesian information criterion (BIC), the model in which the number761
of particles L and shape a0 were fixed across subjects, while guessing rate  was762
allowed to vary between participants (i.e., Model 4), was found to fit best (Table763
2). By contrast, fit for the model in which the number of particles L was allowed to764
vary between participants, with a0 and  fixed (Model 3), was comparatively poor.765
The comparison model — with a large number (10,000) of particles — resulted in766
poorer fit both when we allowed shape a0 and noise  to vary between subjects767
(NLL= 41624, BIC= 42955), and when only noise was allowed to vary between768
subjects (NLL= 42469, BIC= 43141). The probability-matching choice rule yielded769
a better fit than the maximum-probability choice rule in all models.770
Table 2: Model comparison, SHJ tasks. We compared model fit under different con-
straints of the number of parameters. Model 1: single set of parameters {L, a0, } fixed
across all participants and problem types. Model 2: single set of parameters per problem
type, fixed across participants. Model 3: different number of particles L per partici-
pant, fixed across problems, with {a0, } fixed across participants. Model 4: different
guessing rate  per participant, fixed across problems, with {L, a0} fixed across partic-
ipants. Model 5: different shape a0 per participant, fixed across problems, with {L, }
fixed across participants. Model 6: single set of parameters per participant, fixed across
problem types. Model 7: single set of parameters per participant-problem type. Values
for the maximum-probability choice rule are shown in parentheses. NLL = negative log
likelihood; BIC = Bayesian information criterion.
Model # free parameters NLL BIC
1 3 40801 (45411) 40819 (45429)
2 18 39669 (44131) 39775 (44237)
3 115 40664 (45251) 41342 (45928)
4 115 38569 (41119) 39246 (41796)
5 115 39336 (45171) 40013 (45848)
6 339 37649 (40827) 39645 (42824)
7 2034 34284 (34915) 46261 (46892)
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The upper panels of Figure 7 display the blockwise average learning curves771
resulting from respectively simulating from Model 3 (vary particles), Model 4 (vary772
noise), and Model 5 (vary shape) using the best-fit parameters for each. All models773
produce similar behavior on average, recapitulating the ordering of problem types774
in the experimental data and the qualitative character of the learning curves (cf.775
Fig. 1C).776
The lower panels of Figure 7 plot each participant’s average WMC against777
their best-fit parameters for each model. When only the number of particles L778
was allowed to vary between participants (Model 3), WMC and L were positively779
correlated (r = .30, p < .01), which was consistent with our initial hypothesis.780
Best-fit values of the other parameters (fixed across subjects) were a0 = 0.5 and781
 = 0.04. However, this model was not found to fit the data best. Furthermore,782
assuming that a participant’s best-fit number of particles is a (linear) function of783
WMC, we found that an intercept-only model (NLL= 37823, BIC= 39160), with784
best-fit intercept set to L = 1, fit these data better than a slope-intercept model785
relating these variables (NLL= 37823, BIC= 39166), allowing the other parameters786
(a0 and ) to vary freely in both cases.787
The best-fitting model allowed the guessing rate  to vary between participants,788
while fixing the remaining parameters across participants (Model 4). In this case,789
 was found to be negatively correlated with our aggregate WMC measure (r =790
−.30, p < .01), suggesting that high-WMC participants tended to be less “noisy”791
in their choices. Best-fit values of the remaining parameters, fixed across subjects,792
were a0 = 0.5 and L = 1. Furthermore, we found that a slope-intercept model793
(NLL= 38740, BIC= 40083) fit these data better than an intercept-only model794
(NLL= 39188, BIC= 40525). The best-fit slope was β1 = −0.6, supporting an795
inverse relationship between WMC and variability in behavior.796
In the model in which only shape a0 was allowed to vary between participants797
(Model 5), WMC and a0 were also significantly negatively correlated (r = −.35, p <798
.01). Best-fit values of the other parameters (fixed across subjects) were L = 1 and799
 = 0.03. Here, a slope-intercept model (NLL= 38329, BIC= 39671) fit better than800
an intercept-only model (NLL= 39147, BIC= 40484), with best-fit slope β1 = −0.7.801
While model comparison did not support a model allowing a unique set of pa-802
rameters (L, a0, ) for each participant (Model 6), this was the second-best fitting803
model and it was of interest to examine how the free parameters might trade off804
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against each other. The only significant correlations found were a negative corre-805
lation between best-fit shape and number of particles (r = −.28, p < .01), and a806
positive correlation between shape and guess rate (r = .19, p < .05).807
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Figure 7: SHJ model-fitting results.
Average behavior of best-fit parameters (upper) and scatterplot of average working mem-
ory capacity (WMC) against best-fit parameters (lower) for (A) Model 3 (vary particles L,
fix a0, ); (B) Model 4 (vary noise , fix a0, L); (C) Model 5 (vary shape a0, fix , L). Lower
panels: line of least squares (grey); regression line for best-fit intercept-slope/intercept-
only model (black).
3.2 Knowledge restructuring808
3.2.1 Simulations809
Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012) found a positive association between WMC and810
knowledge restructuring, as measured by an individual’s ability to switch between811
different categorization strategies. We hypothesized that a greater number of par-812
ticles would also give rise to this effect since a greater diversity of hypotheses could813
be represented, leading to an enhanced ability to flexibly shift between represen-814
tations with changes in task demands (Fig. 5). As for our simulations of model815
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performance in the SHJ task, we report results in which the probability-matching816
choice rule is used, since it always yielded better fits to the data (see Table 3 below).817
Figure 8 shows the effect of varying the number of particles L on the degree818
of context sensitivity (CS) change between test sessions (all other model param-819
eters were kept fixed: b = 0.9, a0 = 1,  = 0). Averaging over simulation runs,820
we observe that the extent of CS-change increases gradually with the number of821
particles, regardless of whether the model initially learns a context-insensitive (CI;822
Fig. 8A, left) or knowledge-partitioning (KP; Fig. 8A, right) strategy. This graded823
effect predominantly reflects the effect of averaging over CS changes which are of824
“all or none” character — switch or no switch — where the probability of switch-825
ing increases with the number of particles (Fig. 8B). Interestingly, the empirical826
CS-change scores also display some degree of bimodality, though this is not to the827
same extent, nor does the degree of bimodality notably differ between high- and828
low-WMC participants (see Appendix, Fig. S2A). Analogous to the increase in suc-829
cessful switching that we observe in simulations, it is also the case that participants’830
probability of making a successful switch (defined as for simulations, i.e., a change831
in CS between test sessions that crosses 0.5) increases on average with higher WMC832
(see Appendix, Fig. S2B).833
3.2.2 Model-fitting834
As for the SHJ tasks, we fit models of different complexity to the data. In the835
knowledge restructuring task, we found that allowing each participant to have their836
own set of parameters fit the data better in terms of BIC than simpler, less flexible837
models (Table 3). As in the SHJ case, the comparison model, with L = 10, 000838
particles, always resulted in a poorer fit, and the probability-matching choice rule839
yielded a better fit than the maximum-probability choice rule in all models (Table840
3).841
Figures 9A–C show aspects of behavior of the best model using the best-fitting842
parameters for each participant. Figure 9A shows that the average changes in843
context sensitivity between transfer tests of the model qualitatively resemble the844
empirical data (cf. Fig 1C). Similarly, Figure 9B confirms that the model generalizes845
its categorization behavior to test stimuli in a strategy-dependent manner that846
closely resembles the “ideal” response profiles (cf. Fig 1B), and the generalization847
patterns of participants (see Figure 7 in Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012). A median848
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Figure 8: A greater number of particles leads to improved strategy switching.
(A) In both the context-sensitive (CI)-first (left) and knowledge-partitioning (KP)-first
(right) condition, increasing the number of particles L leads to a greater change in context
sensitivity (CS) score on average when prompted to change strategy. Average CS scores
from 1500 simulation runs per condition. (B) The effect arises because the probability
of successfully switching between strategies, P (switch), increases with more particles. A
successful switch is here defined as a change in context sensitivity between test sessions,
∆CS, which “crosses” a score of 0.5. Lower inset: with fewer particles (L = 20), it will
frequently occur that the model completely fails to switch (i.e., ∆CS = 0), as visible from
the distribution over change values ∆CS. Upper inset: with more particles (L = 100),
such failures are very unlikely. Switch probabilities and distributions are from 3000
simulation runs. All other parameter values were fixed: b = 0.9, a0 = 1,  = 0.
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Table 3: Model comparison, knowledge restructuring task. We compared model fit under
different constraints of the number of parameters. Model 1: single set of parameters
{L, b, a0, } fixed across all participants. Model 2: different number of particles L per
participant, with {b, a0, } fixed across participants. Model 3: different bias b per partici-
pant, with {L, a0, } fixed across participants. Model 4: different shape a0 per participant,
with {L, b, } fixed across participants. Model 5: different noise  per participant, with
{L, b, a0} fixed across participants. Model 6: single set of parameters per participant.
Values for the maximum-probability choice rule are shown in parentheses. NLL = nega-
tive log likelihood; BIC = Bayesian information criterion.
Model # free parameters NLL BIC
1 4 24535 (25051) 24557 (25074)
2 103 23366 (23833) 23950 (24416)
3 103 23837 (24641) 24421 (25224)
4 103 23826 (24421) 24409 (25005)
5 103 22915 (23924) 23499 (24507)
6 400 21165 (21709) 23431 (23975)
split of best-fit parameters according to number of particles also leads to a pattern849
of changes in context sensitivity that resembles that of participants when grouped850
by WMC scores: simulations using greater numbers of particles show larger CS851
changes (compare Figs 9C and 1D).852
When we examined the relationships between individuals’ average WMC scores853
and best-fitting parameters (Fig. 9D), we found that there was no significant cor-854
relation between WMC and best-fit number of particles (r(98) = .09, p = .38, n.s.).855
However, this correlation analysis is affected by tradeoffs between parameters, which856
would likely act to reduce the correlation coefficient. A more robust analysis comes857
from comparing a slope-intercept model, in which WMC is assumed to be linearly858
related to the number of particles, to an intercept-only model, where the number of859
particles is assumed to be fixed and independent of WMC; the other parameters are860
free to vary, as this analysis is less affected by parameter tradeoffs (the same anal-861
ysis was applied to the SHJ results, above). A slope-intercept model (NLL=22045,862
BIC=23756) was found to fit this relationship better than an intercept-only model863
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(NLL=22078, BIC=23786), but the best-fitting slope was small, suggesting a rather864
weak effect (β1 = 9; black line in Fig. 9D).865
As in the SHJ tasks, we found a significant negative correlation between WMC866
and guessing rate  (r(98) = −.26, p < .01; Fig. 9E). A slope-intercept model with867
slope β1 = −0.3 (NLL=22153, BIC=23863) fit better than an intercept-only model868
(NLL=22326, BIC=24032).869
We found no significant correlation between WMC and shape a0 (r(98) =870
−.03, p = .75, n.s.; Fig. 9F). A slope-intercept model (NLL=21473, BIC=23184),871
with slope β1 = −0.4, was found to fit this relationship better than an intercept-only872
model (NLL=21496, BIC=23201).873
Finally, there was a significant correlation between WMC and bias b (r(98) =874
.27, p < .01; Fig. 9G). A slope-intercept model (NLL=21459, BIC=23170), with875
slope β1 = 0.9, was found to fit this relationship better than an intercept-only876
model (NLL=21489, BIC=23194).877
As in the SHJ case, it was of interest to examine how these best-fitting param-878
eters potentially traded off against each other. We found a negative correlation879
between the number of particles L and the guessing rate  (r(98) = −.40, p < .01).880
We also found that bias b was positively correlated with number of particles L881
(r(98) = .44, p < .01), and negatively correlated with the guessing rate (r(98) =882
−.59, p < .01). Other correlations were not significant.883
4 Discussion884
Dealing with the world’s many uncertainties in a consistent and principled man-885
ner presents a formidable computational challenge. That humans routinely do so886
despite necessarily finite cognitive resources is an impressive feat. Algorithms for887
approximate Bayesian inference provide one natural source of ideas for how this may888
be achieved. Thus, one suggestion has been that people may approximate Bayesian889
computations by representing and manipulating a set of samples drawn according890
to the relevant probability distributions (Sanborn & Chater, 2016), i.e., by imple-891
menting Monte Carlo inference (Gelfand & Smith, 1990; Gordon et al., 1993). Such892
methods admit a spectrum of degrees of approximation, from essentially ideal per-893
formance given plentiful computational resources (e.g., a large number of samples),894
to much coarser approximations when such resources are scarce (e.g., few sam-895
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Figure 9: Knowledge-restructuring model-fitting results.
(A) Simulated average changes in context sensitivity (±1SE; obscured by markers) for
CI-first (squares) and KP-first (circles) conditions. (B) Simulated average probabilities
of categorizing a test stimulus as an instance of category A in the CI-first (upper) and
KP-first (lower) conditions in the first transfer test. Darker shading indicates a higher
probability. (C) Simulated average change (+1SE) in context sensitivity (CS) given a
median split of the best-fit parameters for all participants ranked in terms of numbers of
particles. (D–G) Scatter plots of average WMC scores vs. best-fitting parameters, with
lines of least squares (grey) and regression lines for best-fit intercept-slope models (black):
(D) number of particles L; (E) guessing rate ; (F) shape a0; (G) bias b.
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ples). In the current work, we considered constraints on working memory capacity896
(WMC) in the context of probabilistic inference, asking whether parallels may be897
drawn between WMC limitations and resource-constrained, approximate Bayesian898
inference. In particular, we hypothesized that variations in task performance that899
correlate with WMC would be captured by assuming that WMC directly reflects900
the number of samples, or “particles”, available to perform inference.901
To test this, we focused on experiments that suggest a positive association be-902
tween WMC and two apparently disparate aspects of categorization: (a) the ease903
with which novel categories are learned (Lewandowsky, 2011); and (b) the ability to904
switch between different categorization strategies (Sewell & Lewandowsky, 2012).905
We saw that such categorization tasks can be considered probabilistic inference906
problems in which individuals seek to infer the most probable category structure(s)907
given their prior assumptions and what they subsequently observe. We assumed908
that individuals approximate inference by representing and manipulating in work-909
ing memory a relatively small number of hypotheses (samples/particles) about the910
possible underlying category structures. The number of hypotheses an individual911
is able to entertain at a given time was assumed to depend on their WMC.912
Support for our principal hypothesis was decidedly mixed. On the one hand, we913
provided a “proof of concept” that increasing the number of particles in our algo-914
rithm could both hasten category learning and improve switching performance, at915
least on average. In simulations of the SHJ problem types, we also found that the de-916
gree to which increasing the number of particles differentially improved performance917
in the problem types was closely matched to the manner in which higher WMC is918
differentially associated with improved performance in these problem types; this919
pattern was not matched as well by changes in other parameters. Furthermore,920
when the model was fit to individuals’ behavior in the knowledge-restructuring ex-921
periment of Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012), linear regression between WMC and922
number of particles suggested a positive — albeit rather weak — relationship. On923
the other hand, when the model was fit to individuals’ performance in the SHJ924
tasks (Lewandowsky, 2011), model comparison did not support a variant in which925
the number of particles changes as a function of WMC. Rather, the winning model926
favored setting the number of particles to one, and captured individual variation927
in performance through the guessing-rate, or “noise”, parameter. Possible reasons928
for this mixed picture are discussed next.929
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4.1 Limitations930
One possible reason for our failure to find a relationship in the SHJ case is the931
relatively weak effect of varying the number of particles on learning rate. That932
is, although we demonstrated that increasing the number of particles could hasten933
category learning in these problems, the effect was subtle — the improvement in934
learning was relatively small, and generally reached asymptote at a comparatively935
small number of particles (cf. Fig. 6A).936
A second contributory factor to the mixed picture — though we believe our937
regression analyses mitigate this — is likely the substantial correlations between938
model parameters. In formulating the category learning model, we included the pos-939
sibility that various of its parameters — not just number of particles — would show940
variation when fit to behavior. As our results made clear, the parameters showed941
substantial correlations, making the job of disentangling their effects more difficult.942
In the SHJ case, the best-fitting model had a separate noise/guessing-rate  for943
each participant, with other parameters fixed across participants; both correlation944
and regression indicated a negative relationship between WMC and , suggesting945
that higher WMC participants were less “noisy” in their choices. When we allowed946
all parameters to vary between individuals (the second best fitting model), we saw947
that  and shape a0 were significantly positively correlated, as one might anticipate948
— recall that a higher a0 leads to more tolerance of category structures with mixed949
labels, which would lead to more errors. Furthermore, a0 was negatively correlated950
with the number of particles L, which is also expected, since an increasing num-951
ber of particles tends to reduce the number of errors. However, in this case we952
found no significant correlation between particles L and , which we might have953
expected given their tendencies to decrease and increase errors, respectively. In954
the knowledge-restructuring experiment, the best model allowed all parameters to955
vary between participants, and here we did indeed find that L and  were nega-956
tively correlated. The fact that the bias parameter b was respectively positively957
and negatively correlated with L and  also makes sense, since a lower bias would958
tend to generate more classification errors. Although we haven’t demonstrated it959
here, we expect that b and L would also interact in strategy-switching, in addition960
to the category learning phase, since a higher bias may require a larger number of961
particles to ensure that switching occurs reliably.962
Clearly, our model has multiple sources of variability, or “noise”, that trade off963
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in ways that unfortunately make it difficult to draw strong conclusions from our964
model-fitting results. Of course, this is not an uncommon scenario, and the chal-965
lenge of apportioning behavioral variability to different possible sources is a general966
one. In relation to the latter, it is interesting that we found in all cases that a model967
with a relatively low number of particles (i.e., in the range of 0–100) fit better than968
a model with a large number (10,000) of particles. The purpose of the latter was969
to approximate exact inference more closely, thereby providing a comparison in970
which noise in the inference process (as opposed to other sources of noise, such as971
in the choice process) was minimized. The finding therefore lends some support972
to the idea that inference noise plays a role in accounting for variability in partici-973
pants’ behavior (e.g., Wyart & Koechlin, 2016). However, we would caution against974
drawing too strong a conclusion here — though we did not see much evidence of975
floor/ceiling effects in our fitting results, a more decisive comparison would involve976
an expanded range or parameters (e.g., considering  on the full range [0, 1]).977
We also found that a probability-matching choice rule always fit the data bet-978
ter than a maximum-probability choice rule. Probability-matching behavior has979
previously been reported in the categorization literature (Estes et al., 1989; Gluck980
& Bower, 1988), so this result is perhaps not surprising, even if it is strictly sub-981
optimal in this setting. However, in the context of our model, it is difficult to982
assign responsibility for probability matching to the inference or choice mechanism,983
since probability matching could conceivably arise from either separately, or both984
together. Indeed, since an inference mechanism based on sampling, such as the one985
we have described, would naturally tend to probability matching under a limited986
number of samples (cf. Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2014), the addition987
of a probability-matching choice process makes disentangling these separate sources988
of variability particularly challenging.989
Why, then, did we include noise in the choice process at all? Here, the motiva-990
tion was simply to improve model fit — at least some participants’ behavior was991
more variable than even a severely resource-constrained particle filter (i.e., a single992
particle). The guessing rate primarily represented our ignorance about variability993
arising from sources distinct from sample-based inference (e.g., attentional lapses).994
It is interesting that in both experiments the best-fitting model had guessing rates995
that were negatively correlated with WMC. This is consistent with observations996
that an increase in WMC load is accompanied with what look like random re-997
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sponses (e.g., Adam, Vogel, & Awh, 2017; Zhang & Luck, 2008), since we would998
then expect individuals with lower WMC (as well as higher WMC individuals under999
increased memory load) to guess more often because their capacity is lower. How-1000
ever, given that our starting point was the operationalization of WMC in terms of1001
number of particles L, the fact that we only found a negative correlation between1002
L and  in one of the two experiments is only partially consistent with this.1003
Another limitation concerns our model’s inability to handle particular atten-1004
tional phenomena. In our presentation of the results of Sewell and Lewandowsky1005
(2012), we briefly highlighted that high-WMC participants displayed significantly1006
greater changes in context sensitivity (CS) in Session 1 but not in Session 2, where1007
low-WMC participants appeared to “catch up”; in our model, by contrast, there is1008
no reason to expect the amount of CS change to vary for different sessions (compare1009
Figs 2D and 9C). At least some of the asymmetry in the human data is likely to1010
arise due to attentional factors that are not included in our model. In particular,1011
Sewell and Lewandowsky (2012) noted that participants in the KP-first condition1012
generally found it easier to switch in Session 1 than participants in the CI-first con-1013
dition (compare the magnitude of CS change between transfer tests 1 and 2 for the1014
two conditions in Fig. 2C). In their interpretation of this, Sewell and Lewandowsky1015
appealed to dimensional relevance shifts, and specifically to evidence that it is easier1016
to attend to a previously relevant dimension than to a previously ignored dimension1017
(e.g., Kruschke, 1996). Thus, in the CI-first condition, participants initially learn1018
to ignore one of the dimensions (color, or “context”), since it is not involved in1019
the CI strategy; this means that it will be harder to switch to the KP strategy,1020
since the latter requires attending to the previously ignored dimension. In the KP-1021
first condition, by contrast, participants initially attend to all stimulus dimensions,1022
so do not have to learn to attend to a previously ignored dimension. A modest1023
augmentation of the current model with a prior that incorporates the assumption1024
that only a subset of stimulus dimensions may be relevant to classification (i.e., a1025
sparsity assumption) would conceivably address the asymmetry between KP-first1026
and CI-first conditions, but presumably not the fact that low-WMC participants1027
appear to catch up with high-WMC participants in Session 2.1028
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4.2 WMC and search efficiency1029
Category learning in the model proceeded quicker with more samples due to what1030
we might refer to as increased search efficiency. Category structures that represent1031
“good” solutions to the category learning problem were those with high posterior1032
probability, and so the inference problem could be thought of in terms of search for1033
such category structures in the hypothesis space (cf. Fig. 4). The more resources1034
available to search this space — the more samples — then the more likely it is1035
that (a) a good solution is discovered at all, and (b) a good solution is discovered1036
quickly. In our simulations, we found that the marginal benefit to learning rate1037
of increasing the number of samples was rapidly diminishing (cf. Fig. 6A), though1038
we expect the point at which this occurs to depend on both the complexity of the1039
problem and the precise details of the inference algorithm.1040
In more psychological terms, the implication is that the greater the number1041
of hypotheses that one can entertain and manipulate within working memory, the1042
more likely that one will quickly discover good solutions. The idea of exploring a1043
space of solutions is of course well-established in psychology, where problem-solving1044
has long been cast in such terms (Newell & Simon, 1972; Simon, 1983). There,1045
however, the search problem is conventionally defined in terms of finding a path1046
from an initial state to an explicit goal state while minimizing the path cost. This1047
is rather different from search in the present case, which is best described in terms1048
of simple stochastic hill-climbing in the absence of an explicit goal representation1049
or, indeed, a path cost. Nevertheless, the idea that one may have greater or lesser1050
resources with which to search may be fruitful in considering the link between WMC1051
and problem solving more generally (Hambrick & Engle, 2003). Other stochastic1052
sampling algorithms that have been applied to finding action sequences in large1053
search spaces, such as Monte Carlo tree search (Coulom, 2006; Gelly & Silver,1054
2011), may also be a natural source of inspiration in such settings.1055
Interestingly, we also found some evidence in the data of Lewandowsky (2011)1056
that WMC may interact with extent of Type II advantage in the SHJ tasks. Ad-1057
ditional analysis of the experimental data was prompted by the observation in our1058
model that the degree of Type II advantage appeared to be modulated by the num-1059
ber of particles (cf. Fig. 6A). This is consistent with the recent suggestion, in the1060
context of category learning in older adults, that Type II advantage is modulated1061
by WMC (Rabi & Minda, 2016), though our present model does not speak to the1062
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observation that relative performance on Type II and Type IV problems may some-1063
times reverse (e.g., in older adults — see Badham, Sanborn, & Maylor, 2017; Rabi1064
& Minda, 2016).1065
4.3 WMC and flexibility1066
A greater number of samples led not only to faster category learning, but also to an1067
improved ability to switch between categorization strategies. This was due to an1068
increase in what we might call representational adequacy. That is, with a greater1069
number of samples, the full posterior distribution over category structures was more1070
accurately represented, encompassing category structures that were assigned lower1071
probability. By representing this greater plurality of category structures, the model1072
could easily express alternative hypotheses when instructed to switch strategy, as1073
operationalized by a reweighting of the current sample/hypothesis set (cf. Fig. 5).1074
Again, in more psychological terms, the obvious interpretation is that the greater1075
one’s ability to entertain a variety of hypotheses, the more flexible one will be.1076
There is evidence that individuals with higher WMC are better at solving so-called1077
“insight” problems, and this may be because such problems are exactly those that1078
require keeping in mind several different possibilities (Gilhooly & Fioratou, 2009;1079
Murray & Byrne, 2005). Indeed, insight problems typically involve inducing task1080
representations in participants which are not conducive to solving the problem,1081
and so require “restructuring” of the initial task representation (Ohlsson, 1992;1082
Weisberg, 1995).1083
4.4 Related work1084
The current study is framed by a number of related strands of research. Most1085
pertinently, Lewandowsky and colleagues have themselves previously addressed the1086
experimental results discussed here, though using a rather different modeling ap-1087
proach. Lewandowsky (2011) found that individual differences in category learning1088
performance could be captured by varying only the learning rate of a particular1089
category learning model (ALCOVE; Kruschke, 1992), but did not establish a ratio-1090
nale for why WMC should be related to this parameter. Sewell and Lewandowsky1091
(2011) found that while a “single-module” model such as ALCOVE failed to capture1092
the general ability to fluidly switch between categorization strategies, a “multiple-1093
module” model, such as ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) — which is able to1094
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learn more than one mapping between stimuli and category labels — could do so.1095
However, a mechanism by which such recoordination could take place was not pro-1096
posed, nor was the issue of why WMC should be related to this ability addressed.1097
In the current work, we provide a model able to capture both experimental results1098
using a single mechanism (i.e., variation in the number of samples), propose a sim-1099
ple mechanism for how recoordination could occur (i.e., importance reweighting),1100
and offer rationales for why WMC may be associated with faster learning (search1101
efficiency) and flexibility (representational adequacy).1102
Levy et al. (2008) directly anticipate our suggestion that the number of samples1103
used for inference may be equated with WMC in their exploration of “garden path”1104
effects in sentence processing. Briefly, garden path sentences (e.g., “The old man the1105
boat.”) are grammatical sentences that people typically fail to parse correctly, at1106
least at first, due to early parts of the sentence tending to promote one (incorrect)1107
interpretation over another. This initial interpretation then leads to subsequent1108
difficulties of comprehension. Levy et al. suggested that difficulties in parsing such1109
sentences correctly — and in particular, the probability of successfully re-parsing1110
the sentence in light of disambiguating information arriving late in the sentence —1111
may be explained by constraints on the resources (i.e., number of samples) available1112
for incremental parsing. They showed that a particle filter model for performing1113
online inference could reproduce these phenomena, with variation of the number1114
of particles altering the strength of the effects. In particular, as the number of1115
particles decreased, the probability that the correct interpretation of the sentence1116
was not represented in the ensemble — leading to parse failure — increased. This1117
is exactly analogous to the mechanism suggested to account for category switching1118
performance in the current work: a lower number of particles makes it less likely1119
that the alternative strategy is represented, meaning that the probability of being1120
able to switch is decreased. However, the current work goes beyond Levy et al. both1121
in expanding the range of phenomena explained (i.e., both switching and learning1122
effects) and in actually measuring correlations between best-fit model parameters1123
and WMC scores.1124
The HyGene model of Dougherty and colleagues (Dougherty, Thomas, & Lange,1125
2010; Thomas, Dougherty, Sprenger, & Harbison, 2008) is also closely related to1126
the current work. HyGene provides a general framework for diagnostic inference,1127
incorporating processes by which hypotheses may be generated and maintained in1128
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working memory. This includes the assumption that working memory processes1129
constrain the number of hypotheses that one can actively maintain, though to1130
the best of our knowledge this framework has not been applied to the domain of1131
category learning that we consider here.1132
Finally, a number of previous models have considered the category learning1133
problem in Bayesian terms (Anderson, 1991; Goodman et al., 2008; Sanborn et al.,1134
2006, 2010). Notably, both Sanborn et al. (2006, 2010) and Goodman et al. (2008),1135
despite considering rather different category representations, considered sample-1136
based inference to be a particularly good candidate as a psychological mechanism1137
for approximating Bayesian inference. For example, Sanborn et al. found that they1138
were able to replicate a wide range of category learning effects by fitting relatively1139
few samples to experimental data, though individual differences were not explored1140
in that work. Our use of a representation based on classification and regression trees1141
(CART) was primarily driven by pragmatic reasons, in particular what seemed most1142
natural for the tasks concerned, rather than a theoretical commitment to a partic-1143
ular way of representing categories. We expect similar results to be obtained with1144
alternative category representations, such as those used in the Rational Model of1145
Categorization (Anderson, 1990; Sanborn et al., 2010) and Rational Rules (Good-1146
man et al., 2008).1147
4.5 Future directions1148
The current work suggests a number of avenues for future investigation. One is1149
to further explore the relative contributions of different components of the infer-1150
ence process. For example, search in the model effectively relies on two processes.1151
The first is resampling, in which particles with lower probability are discarded and1152
particles with higher probability are copied. Intuitively, this should be beneficial1153
for learning since search is then focused on more “promising” (i.e., high probabil-1154
ity) regions of hypothesis space. The second process is the proposal and accep-1155
tance/rejection of new hypotheses via MCMC moves, leading to local hill-climbing1156
in probability space. A more detailed understanding of how these processes in-1157
teract, and how they may relate to various psychological phenomena, would be of1158
interest.1159
Similarly, one could consider alternative conceptualizations of the process by1160
which participants switch between different categorization strategies. We imple-1161
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mented strategy-switching as a simple reweighting operation on particles according1162
to a new target distribution. One consequence of this modeling choice is that it may1163
be impossible — at least for the initial time step — to switch to a new strategy if1164
the corresponding region of hypothesis space is not represented. Though we found1165
some hints of bimodality in the human data, the prospect of such “catastrophic fail-1166
ure” may not seem entirely realistic, so one could imagine exploring modifications1167
such as allowing additional propose-accept/reject steps during this phase.1168
More generally, it is likely that there is a trade-off between the sophistication of1169
the processes by which individual hypotheses are maintained and manipulated, and1170
the number of such hypotheses that one would need to support. In other words, one1171
could presumably replace a larger number of relatively “dumb” particles/hypotheses1172
with a smaller number of comparatively “smart” particles/hypotheses. Indeed, it1173
has recently been suggested that, at least when considering more global hypotheses1174
about the world where the hypothesis space becomes particularly complex, only one1175
hypothesis would plausibly be represented (Bramley, Dayan, Griffiths, & Lagnado,1176
2017). How to negotiate this spectrum of possibilities is a pressing challenge.1177
Clearly, future work should also test whether the current modeling approach1178
can be applied to other category learning tasks and beyond. As mentioned in the1179
Introduction, it has been suggested that category learning tasks which can be solved1180
with relatively simple, verbalizable rules (“rule-based” tasks) are especially reliant1181
on working memory, while tasks with solutions that generally defy description in1182
terms of simple rules (“information-integration” tasks) are not (Ashby & Mad-1183
dox, 2005, 2011; Ashby & O’Brien, 2005). However, recent results suggest rather1184
that working memory is equally involved in these different types of task (Craig1185
& Lewandowsky, 2012; Lewandowsky et al., 2012). An obvious first step would1186
therefore be to assess whether the current approach can be applied to tasks that1187
are more clearly of the information-integration type.1188
A broader challenge for rational process models is to find constraints that will1189
help determine more precisely the algorithms that underpin cognition. In the1190
present work, we followed previous suggestions that inference algorithms based on1191
Monte Carlo sampling are promising, but this only weakly constrains the variety1192
of models under consideration. Determining the signatures of particular modeling1193
choices within this larger class, and how these may succeed or fail in matching1194
features of human cognition and behavior, is a substantial task for future research.1195
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Figure S1: Interaction of Type II advantage with working memory capacity.
Average learning curves (±1SE) for Types II and IV in the experiment of Lewandowsky
(2011) for (A) all participants; (B) participants with lower-median WMC scores; and (C)
participants with upper-median WMC scores. Only the high WMC participants show a
Type II advantage (see main text for statistics).
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Figure S2: Participants’ context-sensitivity changes and switch probabilities.
(A) Distribution of (absolute) changes in context sensitivity (∆CS; pooling over both
test sessions) for low (left) and high (right) WMC participants. (B) The probability of
making a successful switch of categorization strategy goes up with increasing WMC. Mean
probabilities of a successful switch were respectively .64, .77, .89, and .96 for participants
with WMC scores in the lower quartile (↓ 25), lower median (↓ 50), upper median (↑ 50),
and upper quartile (↑ 25) of the experimental population. These scores are superimposed,
for comparison, on the probability of switching as a function of the number of particles
obtained from simulations (cf. Fig. 8B). As in the simulation results, a successful switch
is defined as a change in context sensitivity between test sessions, ∆CS, that “crosses”
a score of 0.5.
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